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My Trademark Is Not Your Domain: Development
and Recent Interpretation of the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act
INTRODUCTION

The Internet has become an integral part of everyday life in
America. In the United States alone, the Internet links more than 57
million people.' The Internet provides sellers of goods and services
with the opportunity to advertise and reach an audience of millions
of people with a minimal investment. 2 Companies and groups have
rushed to register their names 3 and stake their claims in cyberspace
to either solidify their existing business position or embark on new
e-business ventures. 4 Accordingly, a domain name has become one
of the most valuable and important pieces of intellectual property
for business today.
Cybersquatters are "individuals [who] attempt to profit from the
Internet by reserving and later selling or licensing domain names
back to the companies that spent millions of dollars developing the
good will of the trademark." 5 A cybersquatter registers a trademark
or trade name of a third party as an internet domain name, with
the intent of selling the domain name to the legitimate owner of
the mark or a third party.6 "Due to the lack of any regulatory
control over domain name registration . . . 'cybersquatting' has
7
become increasingly common in recent years."
The enactment of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act ("ACPA") by Congress is an attempt to protect consumers and
1. World Wide Web User Statistics (last modified Mar. 6, 1999) <http://
www.why-not.com/company/stats.htm>. This estimate is based upon data from May, 1998. Id.
Obviously, the number of people has probably greatly increased.
2. ADAM L BROOKMAN, TRADEMARK LAW 7-3, 7-4 (1999).
3. There were 28,781,217 domains registered worldwide as of September 19, 2000. Net
Names (visited September 19, 2000) <http://www.domainstats.com>.
4. World Wide Web User Statistics (last modified Mar. 6, 1999) <http://
www.why-not.com/company/stats.htm>. During the 1998 holiday retail season, U.S. consumer
purchasing on the Internet accounted for over $8,000,000,000. Id.
5. Intermatic, Inc. v. 7beppen, 947 F Supp. 1227, 1233 (N.D. M. 1996).
6. ADAM L BROOKMAN, TRADEMARK LAW 7-6 (1999).
7. Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Mkt., 202 F3d 489, 493 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 120
S. Ct. 2719 (2000).
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trademark owners from cybersquatters.8 This comment examines
cybersquatting in relation to federal trademark law and is divided
into four sections to achieve this goal. Part II examines attempts,
prior to enactment of the ACPA, to stop cybersquatters under
federal trademark law using both trademark infringement and
dilution claims. Part III analyzes the history, development and
pertinent sections of the ACPA. Part IV reviews the only
interpretation of the ACPA to date by a federal court of appeals.
Finally, this comment ends by providing conclusions and
recommendations for analyzing cybersquatting cases under federal
trademark law.
I. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND

In order to more fully understand the problem of cybersquatting,
a brief discussion of the technical aspects of the Internet is
appropriate. Internet web sites are designated by an address
commonly known as a "domain name."9 The domain name is
comprised of two parts, the top-level domain and the secondary
level domain. The top-level domain is the domain name's suffix and
commonly classifies the general type of web site or owner of the
domain name. The major top-level domains are ".com"
(commercial), ".org" (organization), ".net" (network provider),
".gov" (government), and ".edu" (educational). The secondary level
domain is the "address" and pinpoints the web site on the Internet.
As an example, for the web site microsoft.com, the top-level
domain of the web site is ".com," signifying the type of web site
(commercial), and the secondary level domain is "Microsoft,"
providing the address or pinpoint for the web site. Each domain
name is a unique identifying address for the corresponding web
site.
Until recently, Network Solutions, Inc. ("NSI") was the sole
8. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (West Supp. 2000). The stated purpose of the ACPA by the
House of Representatives was "to prevent the misappropriation of marks." H.R. REP. No.
4122, at 1 (1999). The act was originally titled the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act during the Senate proceedings and debate. S. REP, No. 10629-01, at 1 (1999). The act was
renamed the Trademark Cyberpiracy Prevention Act in the subsequent House Report. H.R
REP. No. 4122, at 1 (1999). For this comment, the more common name of Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act will be used.
9. See Peter Brown, 17th Annual Institute on Computer Law: The Evolving Law of
the Internet-Commerce, Free Speech, Security, Obscenity and Entertainment, 471 PLI/Pat
151 (1997); J. THOMAS McCARTHY, McCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETTON § 25:72
(4th ed. 1997); Name Space, Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 202 E3d 573 (2d Cir. 2000) for a
more thorough discussion of the technical aspects of domain names.
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source for distributing domain names to registrants. 0 NSI
distributed domain names on a "first come, first serve" basis, only
checking for uniqueness by determining if the precise name had
been registered by another party.11 Therefore, individuals were able
to register domain names without regard to any potential
intellectual property rights existing in the name. Several
organizations now distribute and register Internet domain names,
including NSI.12 A not-for-profit corporation, the Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers ("ICANN"), was
established in 1998 to assume management and oversight of domain
13
name registration practices.
I.

CYBERSQUATT1NG PRIOR TO ENACTMENT OF THE ANTICYBERSQUATrING
CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT

Before examining the ACPA, a review of cybersquatting cases
under traditional trademark law, prior to the enactment of the
ACPA, is necessary to understand the difficulty in preventing
cybersquatting. Prior to enactment of the ACPA, acts of
cybersquatting were primarily combated by filing trademark
infringement claims and dilution claims under state law and under
federal law via the Lanham Trademark Act ("Lanham Act"). 14 Courts
"stretched the law" to combat the actions of cybersquatters under
federal trademark law.15
Under federal law, a trademark is "any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof-i) used by a person, or 2)
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies to register on the principal register, . . . to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
10. As of August 1, 1999, NSI was responsible for approximately 75% of all registered
domain names. ADAM L BROOKMAN, TRADEMARK LAw § 7.02, at 7-5 (1999) (citing Internic
Registrations <http://www.domainnamestats.com/interric.cfm>.)
11. See John D. Mercer, Cybersquatting: Blackmail on the Information Superhighway,
6 B.U. J. SCL & TECH. L. 11 (2000).
12. See, e.g., Register.com (visited September 19, 2000) <http://www.register.com>. The
InterNIC web site, a service mark of the U.S. Department of Commerce, contains a listing of
accredited domain name registration services. Internic.net (last modified Jan. 5, 2000) <http:/
/rs.internic.net>
13. Nancy J. Felsten, Trademarks, Domain Names, Metatags, Cybersquatting and the
Internet, 601PLI/Pat 251, 260 (2000). See McCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 25:74.2 for a
discussion of the ICANN dispute resolution procedures.
14. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F3d 868 (9th Cir. 1999); Panavision
International, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998); Intermatic Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F
Supp. 1227 (N.D. 111.1996).
15. McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 25:77.
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manufactured or sold by others."16 Trademarks signify the source or
origin of goods or services for consumers and are an important
instrument in the advertising and selling of goods or services.17 The
Lanham Act prohibits the use of another's trademark without
permission in connection with the sale or offering for sale of goods
and services in a manner likely to cause confusion, mistake, or
18
deception as to the origin of the goods.
A. Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
Trademark owners have frequently claimed trademark dilution
under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act ("FTDA') 1 9 to prevent
cybersquatting. Under the FTDA for a trademark dilution claim to
be successful, a plaintiff must show that: (1) the mark is famous,
(2) the defendant is using the mark in commerce, (3) the
defendant's use of the mark began after the mark became famous,
and (4) defendant's use of the mark dilutes the quality of the mark
by diminishing the capacity of the mark to identify and distinguish
goods and services. 20 Dilution is defined by the FTDA as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services."21 Dilution occurs when a defendant's
use of a famous trademark lessens the distinctiveness of the mark
by blurring or tarnishing the trademark holder's commercial
22
image.
An illustrative example of a trademark dilution claim for
cybersquatting under the FTDA, prior to enactment of the ACPA, is
the group of cases involving Dennis Toeppen 3 ("Toeppen). 2 4 The
16. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994).
17. See McCARTfy, supra note 9, at § 3:01.
18. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1998).
19. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c) (West 1998).
20. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). It is clear that Congress intended the FrDA to combat
cybersquatting. "[Ilt is my hope that this anti-dilution statute can help stem the use of
deceptive Internet addresses taken by those who are choosing marks that are associated
with the products and reputations of others." 141 CONG. REC. § 19312-01 (daily ed. Dec. 29,
1995) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
21. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127.
22. Blurring occurs when a party uses another's trademark to identify goods and
services not associated with the trademark holder thereby lessening its ability to serve as a
unique identifier of the trademark holders goods and services. MCCARTHY, supra note 9, §
24:68. Tarnishment occurs when a trademark is associated with an inferior or offensive good
or service. Id. at § 24:104.
23. Toeppen has been referred to as the "poster child" of cybersquatting. Jeremy D.
Mishkin, Master of Your Domain - An Overview of the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act, 18-SPG CoM. LAw 3 (2000).
24. See Panavision, 141 F3d 1316; Intermatic, 947 F Supp. 1227. Mr. Toeppen
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seminal case involving Toeppen arose in 1995 when Panavision
International ("Panavision") attempted to register "panavision.com"
as an internet domain name, but found the name had already been
registered by Toeppen. 25 The web page for panavision.com
developed by Toeppen displayed photographs of the City of Pana,
Illinois.2 6 Counsel for Panavision sent a letter to Toeppen informing
him that the word "panavision" was a trademark of Panavision and
requesting Toeppen to stop using the trademark and domain name
panavision.com. 2 1 In response, Toeppen stated he had the right to
use the domain name and continued:
[i]f your attorney has advised you otherwise, he is trying to
screw you. He wants to blaze new trails in the legal frontier at
your expense. Why do you want to fund your attorney's
purchase of a new boat (or whatever) when you can facilitate
the acquisition of 'panavision.com' cheaply and simply
28
instead.
Toeppen subsequently offered to "settle the matter" in exchange for
$13,000.29
Panavision brought suit against Toeppen in the Federal District
Court for the Central District of California, alleging federal
trademark dilution under the Lanham Act and state law ° In the
suit, Panavision asserted that Toeppen "was in the business of
stealing trademarks, registering them as domain names on the
Internet, and then selling the domain names to the rightful
trademark owners."31 The district court granted summary judgment
in favor of Panavision on both the federal and state trademark
dilution claims.32 Toeppen appealed to the United States Court of
registered hundreds of domain names comprising a veritable who's who of trademarks
including deltaairlines.com, britishairways.com, crateandbarrel.com, eddiebauer.com, and
ussteel.com. Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1230.
25. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319.
26. Id. The panavision.com web site is currently listed as the future home of
Panavision.com with links to Panavision web sites for other countries. Panavision (visited
Nov. 27, 2000) <http://www.panavision.com>.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. Panavision refused Toeppen's demand. Id. In response Toeppen registered the
domain name for another trademark held by Panavision, "panaflex.com." Id. The page for
panaflex.com simply said "Hello." Id.
30. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1319. See Panavision v. Toeppen, 945 F. Supp. 1296 (C.D.
Cal. 1996).
31. Id.
32. Id.
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Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.3- The two primary issues addressed
by the court of appeals in relation to the dilution claims were
whether Toeppen made "commercial use" of the mark and whether
the use caused dilution of the mark.m
Toeppen argued that his use of panavision.com as a domain
35 The
name was not "commercial use" of the mark under the FDA.
court of appeals pointed out that "[c]ase law supports this
argument."36 Toeppen contended that the domain name simply is an
address, unrelated to the content of the page, and a user who
accesses "panavision.com" and sees no reference to Panavision is
unlikely to conclude the page is related to Panavision. 37 The court
of appeals rejected this argument holding that Toeppen's "use is not
as benign as he suggests."3s The court of appeals found that
Toeppen traded on the value of-Panavision's marks and attempted
to exploit the value on the Internet. 39 In summary, the court of
appeals held that Toeppen made commercial use of the mark
through his attempt to sell the trademarks themselves, which is
40
sufficient for "use in commerce" under the FDA.
The court of appeals next addressed whether Toeppen's use of
Panavision's trademarks diluted the marks. 4' Toeppen argued "he is
not diluting the capacity of Panavision marks to identify goods and
services" and that Panavision could simply use some other
address. 42 The court of appeals rejected this argument holding that
"[a] significant purpose of a domain name is to identify the entity
33.

Id.

34. Id. at 1324.
35. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1324. "[O]wner of a famous mark shall be entitled ... to
an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark." 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added).
36. Panavision,141 F3d at 1325. See Avery, 189 E3d 868 ("Commercial use under the
[FrDA] requires the defendant to be using the trademark as a trademark, capitalizing on its
trademark status."); Panavision,945 F Supp. at 1303 ("Registration of a trade[mark] as a
domain name, without more, is not a commercial use of the trademark and therefore is not
within the prohibitions of the [FTDA]."); Academy of Motion Picture Arts & Sciences v.
Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F Supp. 1276 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (mere registration of a domain
name does not constitute commercial use); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Network Solutions,
Inc., 985 F Supp. 949 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (NSI's acceptance of a domain name for registration is
not a commercial use within the meaning of the FrDA); Juno Online Servs. v. Juno Lighting,
979 F Supp. 684, 691 (N.D. MII.1996) ("warehousing" of domain name insufficient for finding
that defendant used or displayed mark in sale or advertising of services).
37. Panavision,141 F3d at 1324-25.
38. Id. at 1325.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1325-26.
41. Panavision,141 F.3d at 1326.
42. Id. at 1326-27.
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that owns the web site."43 A person unsure about the location of a
company's web site address will often guess that the domain name
is the same as the company's name." "A domain name mirroring a
corporate name may be a valuable corporate asset, as it facilitates
communications with a customer base."45 Customers searching for
the Panavision web site will have to wade through hundreds of
domain names to find the correct site if the domain name is not
protected.46 The federal court of appeals held that "[tihis dilutes the
47
value of Panavision's trademark."
The decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Panavision
properly enforced the rights of the trademark holder, but illustrates
the problems encountered by trademark holders in attempting to
prevent cybersquatting using dilution claims under the FIDA.
Finding "commercial use" sufficient to satisfy the FTDA must
constitute more than simply registering the domain name. 48 A
cybersquatter could register a domain name and simply "squat" on
the name and avoid liability under the FTDA. Further, in the
Panavision case, Toeppen did not challenge the fame of the
Panavision mark. 49 However, in other cases, whether a mark is
famous or not has often been difficult to establish.1 As one
commentator has pointed out, "[t]here is no place to go to find out
if a particular mark is 'famous.' There is no special register for
famous marks. Fame must be determined on a case by case basis
in litigation."51 In short, the FTDA provides inadequate protection
for trademark holders in relation to cybersquatting.
43. Id. at 1327. "The domain name serves a dual purpose. It marks the location of the
site within cyberspace . . . but it may also indicate to users some information as to the
content of the site." Peter Brown, 17th Annual Institute on Computer Law: The Evolving
Law of the Internet-Commerce, Free Speech, Security, Obscenity and Entertainment, 471
PLI/Pat 151 (1997).
44. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1327 (citing Cardservice, Int'l v. McGee, 950 F Supp. 737,
741 (E.D. Va 1997)).
45. Id. (citing MTV Networks, Inc. v. Curry, 867 F Supp. 202, 203-04 n.2 (S.D.N.Y.
1994)). Courts have treated domain names as an asset with independent value, and,
consequentially, the value of a web site depends upon the domain name. WaliAM L NORTON,
JR., 6A NORTON BANKR. L & PRAc. 2D § 151:48 (2000).
46. Panavision, 141 F3d. at 1327.
47. Id.
48. See supra note 36.
49. Panavision,141 F.3d at 1324.
50. Avery, 189 F.3d at 874-75 (The Avery Dennison mark did not satisfy the
"famousness" element for protection under the FrDA because the mark was not "truly
prominent and renowned").
51. McCARTHY, supra note 9, at § 24:90.
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Infringement Under the Lanham Act

In addition to dilution claims, trademark holders have instituted
actions on the basis of trademark infringement under the Lanham
Act to prevent cybersquatting. In order to succeed on a claim of
trademark infringement under the Lanham Act, the trademark
holder must show: (1) rights in the trademark and (2) that the
unauthorized use of the trademark by another will likely cause
consumer confusion, deception, or mistake. 2 In determining
infringement, courts have predominantly applied the "likelihood of
confusion" test set forth in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In determining infringement using
this test, a court will evaluate: "(1) the strength of the mark; (2)
proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of
actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods
and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7)
defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of
expansion of the product lines."M
An illustrative example of a trademark infringement claim under
the Lanham Act prior to enactment of the ACPA is Brookfield
55
Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.
Brookfield Communications, Inc. ("Brookfield") is a content
gathering organization that sells information, including marketing
software and services, to the entertainment industry.5 "Brookfield
expanded into the broader* consumer market with computer
software featuring a searchable database containing
entertainment-industry related information marketed under the
57
'Moviebuff' trademark."
When Brookfield attempted to register the domain name
"moviebuff.com" in 1996 with NSI, it was informed the name had
already been registered by West Coast Entertainment Corp. ("West
Coast").5 Brookfield consequently registered the domain names
"brookfieldcomm.com" and "moviebuffonline.com," and offered
52. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1114(I) (1998).
53. 599 F2d 341 (9th Cir. 1979). The test was first introduced in Polaroid Corp. v.
PolaradElec. Corp., 287 F2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
54. Steekcrafl, 599 F2d at 348-49.
55. 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
56. Brookfield, 174 F3d at 1041.
57. Id. Brookfield was founded in 1987 and began using the "Moviebuff" mark to offer
goods and services in 1993. Id.
58. Id. at 1042.
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access to on-line database services through "inhollywood.com."

59

In

1997, Brookfield submitted applications for federal registration of
"Moviebuff" to designate both goods and services. 60 In 1998,
"Brookfield learned that West Coast... intended to launch a web
site at 'moviebuff.com' containing . . . a searchable entertainment
database similar to [Brookfield's]." 6' Brookfield sent a "cease and
desist" letter to West Coast claiming trademark infringement and
enclosed a complaint that it threatened to file if West Coast did not
62

comply.

Brookfield brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Central District of California alleging principally trademark
infringement and unfair competition under the Lanham Act.6 In
West Coast's opposition brief, it argued that Brookfield could not
claim infringement because West Coast was the senior user of
"MovieBuff" after registering "The Movie Buffs Movie Store" mark
in 1991.64 In the alternative, West Coast claimed senior use of
"moviebuff.com" through use of the domain name prior to
65
Brookfield's offering of the "MovieBuff" on-line database.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that West Coast could
not "tack" use of "moviebuff.com" onto its trademark for "The
Movie Buff's Movie Store" and that Brookfield was the senior user
and had established a likelihood of confusion because of West
Coast's use of "moviebuff.com." 66 In addressing the trademark
infringement claim, the court of appeals first addressed whether
Brookfield was the senior user of the "MovieBuff" mark, and, thus,
had "a valid, protectable trademark interest in the mark."67 "To
acquire ownership of a trademark, it is not enough to have
invented the mark first or even to have registered it first; the party
59. Id.
60. Id. The trademark application described the product as computer software
providing information to the entertainment industry. Id. The service mark application
described the services as providing on-line access to a database containing information about
the entertainment industry. Id.
61. Brookfield, 174 F3d at 1042.
62. Id. The next day West Coast issued a press release announcing the imminent
launch of the "moviebuff.com" web site. Id.
63. Id. at 1043. Brookflield also claimed trademark dilution under the FrDA and state
law. Id. at n.4.
64. Id. at 1043 n.5. "West Coast applied for federal trademark registration for this term
in 1989, which issued in 1991 and became incontestable in 1996. West Coast purports to have
spent over $15 million on advertisements and promotions featuring this mark." Id. at n.5.
65. Id. at 1043.
66. Brookfield, 174 F3d at 1049, 1061.
67. Id. at 1046-47.
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claiming ownership must have been the first to actually use the
mark in the sale of goods or services."6 The court of appeals held
Brookfield to be the senior user in the "MovieBuff" mark since
Brookfield began marketing products under the mark well before
69
West Coast began using "moviebuff.com."
The court of appeals next evaluated whether West Coast's use of
"moviebuff.com" was likely to deceive or confuse the public about
the source or ownership of the web site in violation of Brookfield's
trademark rights.70 The court of appeals applied the factors for the
"likelihood of confusion" test set forth in Sleekcraft7 ' to determine
the similarity of the marks and likelihood of confusion. 7 In
applying the factors, the court of appeals found "MovieBuff" to be
essentially identical to "moviebuff.com," 73 the goods or services of
both parties to be related to the entertainment industry,7 4 and the
web as the primary channel used by both parties to advertise and
market their goods and services. 75 The court of appeals found in
favor of the rights of Brookfield as the senior user and held that
West Coast's use of "moviebuff.com" constituted infringement under
76
the Lanham Act.
The Brookfield case is illustrative of a positive application of
federal trademark law to cybersquatting cases. However, federal
trademark infringement claims under the Lanham Act to prevent
cybersquatting have often produced inconsistent and varying
results. 77 Many cybersquatters, such as Toeppen, would not offer
68. Id. at 1047 (citing Sengoku Works Ltd. v. RMC Int'l Ltd., 96 F.3d 1217, 1219 (9th
Cir. 1996)).
69. Id. at 1049.
70. Id. at 1053.
71. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. The court of appeals recognized that the
Sleekcraft factors are pliant, some factors are more important in determining a likelihood of
confusion than others and they should be applied on a case specific basis. Brookfield, 174
F3d at 1054.
72. Brookfield, 174 F3d at 1054.
73. Id. at 1055.
74. Id. at 1056.
75. Id. at 1057.
76. Id. at 1061.
77. See Intermatic, 947 F Supp. at 1240 (no similarity among products between web
page developed by defendant, showing map of City of Urbana, and plaintiff, manufacturer of
electrical and electronic products); Cardservice, 950 F Supp. at 741 (use of domain name
"cardservice.com" on a web site advertising merchant credit card services was held an
infringement of the registered trademark "cardservice" used for credit card processing);
Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciewes, 989 F Supp. at 1277-79 (concerning a claim
that NSI infringed plaintiff's registered OSCAR trademark by permitting registration of
domain names containing "oscar" and "the oscars," the court held the mere registration of
domain name insufficient for "commercial use" for trademark infringement under the
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services similar to the products offered by the trademark holder,
thus avoiding application of infringement. In addition, the domain
name must meet the "use in commerce" requirement to maintain an
infringement claim under the Lanham Act.7 8 As with dilution claims
under the FrDA, infringement claims under the Lanham Act have
been insufficient to combat cybersquatting.
III.

HISTORY AND FOUNDATION OF THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER

PROTECTION ACT

To protect trademark holders from cybersquatting and promote
the growth of online commerce, 9 the United States Congress
passed the ACPA on October 6, 1999.80 Congress determined that
"legislation is needed to clarify the rights of trademark owners with
respect to . . . abusive domain name registration practices, to
provide clear deterrence to prevent bad faith and abusive conduct,
and to provide adequate remedies for trademark owners."81 On
November 29, 1999, President Clinton signed the ACPA.8 2 The ACPA
provides:
(A) A person shall be liable in a civil action by the owner of a
trademark or service mark if, without regard to the goods or
services of the parties, that person(i) has a bad faith intent to profit from that trademark or
service mark; and
(ii) registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that(I)
in the case of a trademark or service mark that is
distinctive at the time of registration of the domain
name, is identical or confusingly similar to such mark;
(II) in the case of a famous trademark or service mark
that is famous at the time of registration of the
domain name, is dilutive of such mark,
(III) is a trademark, word, or name protected by reason of
section 706 of title 18, United States Code [Red
Cross], or section 220506 of title 36, United States
Code [Olympic Committee].
(B) In determining whether there is a bad faith intent
Lanham Act).
78. See supra note 36.
79.

S. REP. No. 106-140, at 4 (1999).

80.
81.
82.

15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d).
S. Rae. No. 106-140, at 8.
15 U.S.C.A § 1125 (d).

426
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described under subparagraph (A), a court may consider
factors such as, but not limited to(i)
the trademark or other intellectual property rights of
the person, if any, in the domain name;
(ii)
the extent to which the domain name consists of the
legal name of the person or a name that is otherwise
commonly used to identify that person;
(iii)
the person's lawful use, if any, of the domain name
in connection with the bona fide offering of any
goods or services,
(iv)
the person's lawful noncommercial or fair use of the
mark in a site accessible under the domain name,
(v)
the person's intent to divert consumers from the
mark owner's online location to a site accessible
under the domain name that could harm the
goodwill represented by the mark, either for
commercial gain or with the intent to tarnish or
disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of
confusion as to the source, sponsorship, affiliation,
or endorsement of the site;
(vi)
the person's offer to transfer, sell, or otherwise
assign the domain name to the mark owner or any
third party for financial gain without having used, or
having an intent to use, the domain name in the
bona fide offering of any goods or services;
(vii)
the person's provision of material and misleading
false contact information when applying for the
registration of the domain name or the person's
intentional failure to maintain accurate contact
information;
(viii)
the person's registration or acquisition of multiple
domain names which the person knows are identical
or confusingly similar to trademarks or service
marks of others that are distinctive at the time of
registration of such domain names, or dilutive of
famous trademarks or service marks of others that
are famous at the time of registration of such
domain names, without regard to the goods or
services of such persons;
(ix)
the person's history of offering to transfer, sell, or
otherwise assign domain names incorporating marks
of others to the mark owners or any third party for
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consideration without having used, or having an
intent to use, the domain name in the bona fide
offering of any goods and services;
the person's history of providing material and
misleading false contact information when applying
for the registration of other domain names which
incorporate marks, or the person's history of using
aliases in the registration of domain names which
incorporate marks of others; and
the extent to which the trademark or service mark
incorporated in the person's domain name
registration is distinctive and famous within the
meaning of subsection (c)(1) of section 43 of the
Trademark Act of 1946 (15 U.S.C. 1125). s-

The ACPA creates a specific, federal remedy for trademark
holders against cybersquatting. To summarize the pertinent sections
of the ACPA, civil liability is imposed for cybersquatting where (1)
the defendant has registered, trafficked in or used a domain name,
(2) the domain name is identical or confusingly similar to a mark
owned by the plaintiff, (3) the plaintiff's mark is distinctive at the
time the domain name is registered, and (4) the defendant
committed the acts with a bad faith intent to profit from the
plaintiff's mark.84
The ACPA was passed to remedy the perceived shortcomings in
applying the Lanham Act to cybersquatting cases.,, This theme is
pervasive throughout the ACPA and deserves a closer inspection.
First, mere registration of a domain name gives rise to liability
under the ACPA.8 6 A person is liable if that person "has a bad faith
intent to profit from that mark; and ... registers, traffics in or uses
[a mark protected by the ACPA]."8s In contrast, under the Lanham
Act and FTDA, mere registration of a domain name is insufficient
to constitute 'use in commerce' and is therefore not actionable on
the basis of infringement or dilution.88 Thus, the ACPA lowers the
bar for prevention of cybersquatting; a cybersquatter's mere
registration of a domain name is actionable under the ACPA.
Another significant provision of the new legislation is that the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d).
See id.; McCARTHY, supra note 9, § 25:78.
Sporty's, 202 F.3d at 496.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii).
See cases cited supra note 36.
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ACPA simply protects "marks." A "mark" is defined by the Lanham
Act as "any trademark, service mark, collective mark, or
certification mark." 9 As illustrated in the Brookfield case, to
maintain a trademark infringement claim the mark must be
registered under the Lanham Act. ° Under the ACPA, there is no
requirement for a mark to be federally registered for an action to
exist. Therefore, even common law trademark owners could bring
an action under the ACPA against cybersquatters.
The remedies available to victims of cybersquatting before
passage of the ACPA were costly, due to extensive litigation, and
uncertain due to judicial inconsistency in applying available federal
trademark law.91 According to the report of the U.S. House of
Representatives:
Currently, the legal remedies available to trademark owners to
prevent cyber[squatting] 92 are both expensive and uncertain.
Federal courts have generally found in favor of the owner of a
trademark where a similar or identical domain name is
actively used in connection with a cyber[squatters] web site.
The law is less settled, however, where a cyber[squatter] has
either registered the domain name and done nothing more, or
where the cyber[squatter] uses a significant variation on the
trademark. Regardless of the ultimate outcome of litigation,
trademark owners must expend significant resources and
endure the inevitable delay associated with bringing a civil
action in order to validate their rights. Many companies simply
choose to pay extortionate prices to cyber[squatters] in order
to rid themselves of a potentially damaging headache with an
uncertain outcome. 93
Under the ACPA, the remedies available to victims of
cybersquatting 94 include the traditional remedies available under
89. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127.
90. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1057(b), 1115(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000). See Brookfield, 174 F.3d
at 1046-47 (The threshold issue for an infringement claim is whether the mark holder has
registered the mark under the Lanham Act).
91. H.R. REP. No. 412, at 6 (1999).
92. The House Report uses the term cyberpiracy to describe cybersquatting, and
cyberpirate to describe a cybersquatter. For consistency, I have used the more common
terms, cybersquatting and cybersquatter.
93.
H.R. REP. No. 412, at 6.
94. Damages under the ACPA are limited to actions based upon registration or use of a
domain name occurring after November 29, 1999. Consumer Appropriation Act 2000, Pub. L.
No. 106-113, § 3010, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999).
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dilution and infringement claims: injunctions and actual damages.9 5
The ACPA, however, expands the potential damages available by
allowing plaintiffs the option to seek statutory damages in lieu of
actual damages and profits.9 6 The amount of statutory damages is
to be determined through the discretion of the trial court with
97
amounts ranging between $1000 and $100,000 per domain name.
This provision alleviates plaintiffs burden of proving actual
damages caused by cybersquatting. Under the ACPA, plaintiffs may
still attempt to prove damages, but they may request statutory
damages anytime before final judgment.98 In addition, the remedies
under the ACPA are cumulative and not in lieu of any other rights
or remedies available to a plaintiff at law. 9
IV. RECENT INTERPRETATION OF THE ANTICYBERSQUATTING CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT

To date there has been only one federal appellate court
interpretation of the ACPA-Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's
Market. 1°° Sportsman's Market ("Sportsman's") is a mail order
catalog company that primarily provides products for pilots and
aviation enthusiasts, but also provides tools and home
accessories. 10 1 Sportsman's distributes approximately 18 million
catalogs nationwide with annual revenues of about $50 million. 10 2 In
the 1960's, Sportsman's began using the mark "sporty's" in
association with its catalogs and products and subsequently
registered the mark with the United States Patent and Trademark
Office in 1985.'03
Omega, a mail order company that provides scientific
measurement and control instruments, decided in the mid-1990's to
enter the aviation catalog business and formed a wholly owned
subsidiary called Pilot's Depot, LLC, for this purpose.' °4 Omega
95. 15 U.S.C.A §§ 1116(a), 1117(a) (West 1998 & Supp. 2000).
96. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(d) (West Supp. 2000).
97. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(d).
98. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1117(d).
99. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(3).
100. 202 F.3d 489.
101. Sporty's, 202 F.3d at 493-94. "Aviation sales account for about 60% of Sportsman's
revenue, while non-aviation sales comprise the remaining 40%." Id.
102. Id. at 493.
103. Id. at 494. Sportsman's annually spends approximately $10 million advertising the
sporty's mark. Id.
104. Id.
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registered the domain name "sportys.com" shortly thereafter.10
Nine months after registering the sportys.com domain name,
Omega formed a new subsidiary, Sporty's Farm, to grow and sell
Christmas Trees. 1°6 Omega sold the rights to sportys.com to Sporty's
Farm for $16,200 and began advertising Christmas trees for
purchase on the web site. 10 7
In 1996 Sportsman's learned of Omega's registration and use of
sportys.com as a domain name, and, before they could take action,
Omega brought a declaratory action seeking the right to continue
to use the name. Sportsman's counterclaimed and "also sued
Omega as a third-party defendant for . . . (1) trademark
infringement, (2) trademark dilution pursuant to the [Federal
Trademark Dilution Act], and (3) unfair competition under state
law."108
The district court found in favor of Sportsman's Market on the
basis of dilution holding that 1) the mark is "famous" and entitled
to protection under the Lanham Act and 2) Sporty's Farm's
registration of sportys.com diluted the sporty's trademark and
compromised the ability of Sportsman's to distinguish their goods
and services on the Internet. 1°t However, the district court rejected
Sportsman's claims of infringement, finding no likelihood of
consumer confusion because the parties operate wholly unrelated
businesses. 10 The court granted injunctive relief prohibiting
Sporty's Farm from using sportys.com, but held that Sportsman's
was not entitled to punitive damages or costs under the FTDA
since the conduct of Omega did not constitute willful dilution."'
Both Sporty's Farm and Sportsman's appealed the decision of the
105. Id.
106. Sporty's, 202 F3d at 494. When asked how the name "Sporty's Farm" was selected
for Omega's Christmas tree subsidiary, the CEO of Omega stated that the idea came from his
memory of a dog he had as a boy named Spotty that strayed too often and had to be taken
to his uncle's farm in upstate New York. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. During the litigation Sportsman's used the domain name "sportys-catalogs.com"
as its primary domain name. Id.
109. Id. at 494-95. The district court held that "registration of the 'sportys.com' domain
name effectively compromises Sportsman's Market's ability to identify and distinguish its
goods on the Internet . . . [by] preclud[ing] Sportsman's Market from using its 'unique
identifier.' " Id. at 495.
110. Id. at 494. In order to be successful in an action for trademark infringement the
party must show that unauthorized use of the registered trademark will likely cause
consumer confusion, deception or mistake. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1994). See L.E. Waterman
Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272, 273 (2d Cir. 1934).
111. Sporty's, 202 F3d at 495. After the trial, Sportman's obtained the sportys.com
domain name. Id.
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district court to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit.1 12 Sporty's Farm appealed the grant of an injunction in
favor of Sportsman's. Sportsman's cross-appealed the denial of
damages under both the FTDA and the Connecticut Unfair Trade
Practices Act ("CUTPA)."' While the appeal was pending, Congress
14
passed the ACPA.1
The first issue addressed by the court was whether to apply the
ACPA to Sportsman's appeal, since the legislation was passed while
the appeal was pending.11 5 The court held that the laws in effect at
the time of the appeal, in this case the ACPA, should be applied to
16
the appeal.
In applying the ACPA to the case, the court addressed whether 1)
the "sporty's" mark is distinctive or famous and entitled to
protection under the ACPA,1 7 2) the domain name is identical or
confusingly similar to "sporty's" mark,1 18 and 3) Sporty's Farm acted

with a "bad faith intent to profit from the 'sporty's' mark when it
registered the domain name 'sportys.com.' "119
The court agreed with the district court in holding that the
"sporty's" mark is distinctive. However, the court refrained from
determining whether the mark is also a "famous" mark. 12 0 The court
in finding the mark "distinctive" explained that a mark may be
distinctive before even being used in commerce, when there is no
fame attached to the mark. 121 In addition, Sportsman's registered
the mark in compliance with 15 U.S.C. § 1065; therefore,
112. Id. Omega prevailed on all claims and, therefore, did not appeal the judgment. Id.
at 495 & n.8.
113. Id. The district court held that the conduct of Sporty's Farm did not rise to the
level of conduct that is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous, that is necessary to
support a claim under cUPTA. Id. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision
of the district court in relation to the CUPTA claim. Id. at 501.
114. Id. at 495.
115. Id. at 496.
116. Sporty's, 202 E3d at 496 (citing Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 312-13
(1964)).
117. Id. at 497. Under the ACPA, a mark is only protected if the trademark or service
mark is distinctive or famous at the time of registration. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(1),
(I1). The ACPA also protects "trademark[s], word[s], or name[s] protected by reason of
section 706 of title 18 [Red Cross], United States Code, or section 220506 of title 36 [Olympic
Committee], United States Code." 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(l)(A)(ii)(ll). See also text
accompanying note 42.
118. Sporty's, 202 F3d at 497. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
119. Sporty's, 202 F.3d at 498. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
120. Sporty's, 202 F.3d at 497. In order to receive protection under the FTDA, a mark
must be famous and distinctive; however, under the ACPA, protection is provided for
distinctive marks regardless of fame. Id. at n.10. See also 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(E).
121. Sporty's, 202 F3d at 497.
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Sportsman's was entitled "to a presumption that its registered
trademark is inherently distinctive," sufficient for protection under
12
the ACPA.1
The court next addressed whether the domain name
"sportys.com" is "identical or confusingly similar" to the "sporty's"
mark. 12 Apostrophes cannot be used in domain names; therefore,
the court found that the "sportys.com" domain name is virtually
indistinguishable from the "sporty's" mark. 124 The court held that
while the "sportys.com" domain name is not identical to "sporty's,"
it was certainly "confusingly similar" and sufficient for protection
125
under the ACPA.
The court then analyzed whether "Sporty's Farm acted with a
'bad faith intent to profit' from the mark 'sporty's' when it
registered the domain name 'sportys.com.' "126 The court examined
the nine factors provided in the ACPA to determine whether the
defendant acted in bad faith, but recognized that the factors are
"indicia that may be considered along with other facts." 127 In
evaluating the factors provided by the ACPA, the court first pointed
out that neither Sporty's Farm nor Omega had any intellectual
property interest in "sportys.com" at the time the domain name was
registered. 128 Second, the domain name registered by Omega did
not contain any portion of the legal name of the party that
registered the name. 129 Third, the domain name was not used in
connection with the bona fide offering of goods or services until
after litigation was initiated, "undermining the claim that the
122. Id. (citing Equine Techs., Inc. v. Equitechnology, Inc., 68 F3d 542, 545 (1st Cir.
1995)).
123. Sporty's, 202 F.3d at 497. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I). The "confusingly
similar" standard differs from the "likelihood of confusion" standard applied in trademark
infringement cases under the Lanham Act. Id. at n.11. (citing Polaroid, 287 F2d 492).
124. Sporty's, 202 F3d at 497-98.
125. Id. at 498. "[A] trademark or service mark that is famous at the time of
registration of the domain name, is identical or confusingly similar to such mark." Id. The
court of appeals cited Brookfield in support of the contention that the sporty's trademark
and sportys.com domain name are "confusingly similar." Id. In Brookfield, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found the trademark "MovieBuff" and the domain name "moviebuff.com"
virtually indistinguishable since domain names are not capital letter sensitive. Brookfield, 174
F3d at 1055. Similarly, the apostrophe used in the "sporty's" trademark cannot be used in the
"sportys.com" domain name. Sporty's, 202 F3d at 498.
126. Sporty's, 202 F3d at 498. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i).
127. Sporty's, 202 F.3d at 498.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 498-99. Sporty's Farm was not even in existence when Omega registered the
domain name sportys.com. Id. at 494.
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offering of Christmas trees" was in good faith. 130 In addition, the
court found that the following factors supported a conclusion that
bad faith intent existed: Sporty's Farm never claimed the use of the
domain name was noncommercial or fair use of the mark; 131 Omega
sold the domain name to Sporty's Farm under suspicious
circumstances; 132 and the "sporty's" mark is undoubtedly

distinctive. 133
The most important factor the court found in determining that
Sporty's Farm acted with a bad faith intent to profit was not
included in the indicia provided by Congress, but may be
considered under the ACPA.134 Based upon the facts provided by
the district court, it is clear that Omega planned to enter into direct
competition with Sportsman's, and Omega's owners received the
Sportsman's catalogs and, thus, had knowledge "sporty's" was a
strong trademark in the field. 35 The court found, based upon the
record, that Omega registered sportys.com for the primary purpose
of keeping Sportsman's from using the domain name. 36 Omega,
after the suit was initiated, created a wholly unrelated business
(Sporty's Farm) to "(1) use the sportys.com domain name in some
commercial fashion, (2) keep the name away from Sportsman's, and
(3) protect itself in the event that Sportsman's brought an
infringement claim alleging that a 'likelihood of confusion' had been
created by Omega's version of cybersquatting." 37 Finally, the court
recognized that the story provided by Omega relating to the
creation of the Sporty's Farm name was "more amusing than
credible." 1' Based upon these facts, the federal court of appeals
held that Sporty's Farm acted with a bad faith intent to profit from
1 39
the sportys.com domain name under the ACPA.
130. Id. at 499.
131. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IV).
132. See Sporty's Farm v. Sportsman's Market, No. 96CV0756 (D. Conn. 1998); 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(VI).
133. Sporty's, 202 F3d at 499. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(IX).
134. Sporty's, 202 F.3d at 499. "In determining whether there is a bad-faith intent... a
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(1)(B)
court may considerfactors such as, but not limited to .
(emphasis added).
135. Sporty's, 202 F3d at 499.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. See supra note 106.
139. Sporty's, 202 F.3d at 499. However, the federal court of appeals refused to award
damages under the ACPA because Sporty's Farm registered and used the domain name prior
to the passage of the law. Id. at 500 (citing Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 3010).
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CONCLUSION

As the Internet has expanded, courts have been forced to stretch
existing trademark law to protect the rights of trademark owners
from cybersquatters.140 A domain name has become one of the most
important and valuable pieces of intellectual property and will
continue to be an important item as the Internet continues to
expand.
Applying the FJ'DA to cybersquatting cases has expanded the
scope of the law beyond original intentions. The FTDA was
intended to protect only "famous" marks.14 1 In using the ETDA
against cybersquatters, courts have granted protection to
indisputably "famous" marks, but have also allowed protection to
questionable marks. In addition, by expanding the scope of the "use
in commerce" requirement the courts have created precedent that
may allow trademark owners to encroach upon even
noncommercial uses.
The use of trademark infringement claims has often produced
inconsistent and confusing results. 142 To succeed on an
infringement claim, trademark owners must establish that the use
of the domain name is likely to deceive or confuse the public about
the source of ownership or sponsorship of the web site.143 This is
difficult to establish where the cybersquatter may not be promoting
any goods or services via the Internet, let alone similar goods and
services.'"
As the case illustrations contained in this comment demonstrate,
trademark owners have had some success protecting the value of
their marks under existing trademark infringement and dilution law.
However, Congress recognized that the laws did not adequately
protect mark owners and consumers on the Internet. The ACPA
lowers the bar to bring an action against cybersquatters by
imposing liability for even mere registration of a domain name.145
Trademark owners asserting their rights may still bring claims
under traditional infringement and dilution law, but now may add a
claim for violation of the ACPA. 146 The ACPA simply harmonizes
registration of Internet domain name policy with existing trademark
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

See McCAnmy, supra note 9, § 25:77.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c).
See supra note 77.
See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
See supra note 36.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(d)(3). See also, supra, text accompanying note 99.
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law. As Dennis Toeppen so eloquently stated in his letter to
Panavision after registering "panavision.com," your lawyer is trying
"to blaze new trails in the legal frontier at your expense."1 47 Due to
the enactment of the ACPA, your lawyer no longer has to do so.
D. Troy Blair

147. Panavision, 141 F3d at 1319.

